Class Action Settlements: Res Judicata, Release, and the Identical Factual Predicate Doctrine by Kostolansky, Kris J. & Hazel, Diane R.
Idaho Law Review 
Volume 55 Number 3 Article 4 
Class Action Settlements: Res Judicata, Release, and the Identical 
Factual Predicate Doctrine 
Kris J. Kostolansky 
Diane R. Hazel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Kris J. Kostolansky & Diane R. Hazel, Class Action Settlements: Res Judicata, Release, and the Identical 
Factual Predicate Doctrine, 55 IDAHO L. REV. (). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho-law-review/vol55/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Idaho Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, 
please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: RES JUDICATA, RELEASE, 
AND THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE DOCTRINE 
KRIS J. KOSTOLANSKY & DIANE R. HAZEL 
FULL CITATION: 
Kris J. Kostolansky & Diane R. Hazel, Class Action Settlements: Res Judicata, 
Release, and the Identical Factual Predicate Doctrine, 55 IDAHO L. REV. 263 (2019). 
 
 
This article Copyright © 2019 Idaho Law Review Except as otherwise expressly 
provided, permission is hereby granted to photocopy materials from this 
publication for classroom use, provided that: (1) Copies are distributed at or 
below cost; (2) The author of the article and the Idaho Law Review are properly 
identified; (3) Proper notice of the copyright is affixed to each copy; and (4) 
Notice of the use is given to the Idaho Law Review. 
 
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: RES JUDICATA, RELEASE, 
AND THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE DOCTRINE 
KRIS J. KOSTOLANSKY* & DIANE R. HAZEL** 
ABSTRACT 
The “identical factual predicate” rule is a judicial doctrine that limits the 
preclusive scope of class settlements. Under the doctrine, a release in a 
class settlement can release only those claims sharing an identical factual 
predicate with the settled class claims. Although it is undisputed the doc-
trine limits preclusion under the affirmative defense of release, the doctrine 
also limits res judicata. To date, the circuits have adopted inconsistent po-
sitions on whether the doctrine also limits res judicata, and the Supreme 
Court has not provided guidance. This article explains that the doctrine ap-
plies with equal force to res judicata. In the class settlement context, the 
court must enter a final judgment approving the settlement before the set-
tlement becomes final. But as part of the final judgment, the court can only 
release claims that share an identical factual predicate. The doctrine is thus 
embedded within the final judgment prong of res judicata. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The settlement of a class action lawsuit should ideally resolve all issues and 
claims involved in the class litigation for all class members who do not opt out. 
When a putative class member raises similar claims—or claims based on similar 
facts—in a subsequent case, questions regarding res judicata and the scope of the 
class release arise inevitably. The resolution of these issues pits the important doc-
trines of judicial economy and finality against the equally important doctrines of 
due process and reasonable expectations. 
To address these competing interests, the majority of circuits have adopted 
the “identical factual predicate” doctrine (“IFPD”). The IFPD permits a broad release 
of claims—including claims that were not pursued in the underlying class litiga-
tion—if the party raising the defense can show an identical factual predicate be-
tween the underlying class claims and subsequent claims.1 The precise meaning of 
“identical factual predicate” remains subject to interpretation and is evolving within 
the federal circuit courts. Specifically, the circuit courts have adopted inconsistent 
positions on whether the doctrine requires a stricter identity of facts than that re-
quired under res judicata. Some courts have even conflated the two standards un-
derlying res judicata and release. Although no circuit seems to dispute that the IFPD 
applies to the affirmative defense of release, the circuit courts’ varying interpreta-
tions of the IFPD have left open the question of whether the doctrine also applies 
to the defense of res judicata. To further compound the uncertainty, there has been 
no direct guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This article will define the IFPD and explain why the doctrine should apply with 
equal force to the affirmative defenses of release and res judicata. The IFPD is not 
equivalent to the same transaction or occurrence element under res judicata. To 
reach a final judgment on the merits in a class settlement, the underlying court must 
approve the settlement containing the release.2 In approving the settlement and 
release, a court must determine that the released claims arise from the identical 
factual predicate.3 This process, applied correctly, imbeds the IFPD into the res ju-
dicata defense. 
This article first discusses the affirmative defenses of res judicata and release 
and how these defenses may be asserted following a class action settlement. The 
article proceeds to discuss the structure of class settlements and how this struc-
ture—combined with judicial review—balances the competing interests of finality 
and due process. Finally, with this context, the article explains how the identical 
factual predicate doctrine applies to both release and res judicata. 
II. THE DISTINCT DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA & RELEASE 
To understand IFPD in the context of a class settlement, it is first necessary to 
understand the defenses under which an identical factual predicate analysis may 
arise. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “generally refers to the effect of a prior 
                                                          
 1. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 107–09 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 2. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 3. See Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590–91 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of the very same claim.”4 For a claim 
to be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata, the following elements must be 
met: “(1) a valid, final judgment on the merits . . . ; (2) claims arising out of the same 
transaction and occurrence as the initial judgment;” and (3) identity of parties.5 Alt-
hough these elements may vary slightly by circuit, each circuit uses some version of 
this test, and all circuits require that there be a final judgment. If res judicata ap-
plies, the doctrine precludes claims that were raised or could have been raised.6 As 
a result, not only does res judicata bar claims that were brought in the first forum, 
but it also bars all claims relating to the same transaction against the same defend-
ant that could have been brought.7 Res judicata also may be used as an affirmative 
defense in a later litigation when the prior action involved a class settlement be-
cause a court adjudicating the class case must enter a final judgment approving the 
settlement.8 
Release differs from res judicata in that a class settlement may be drafted 
broadly to release claims that were not asserted and might not have been asserted 
in the class action. Because a release may reach claims that could not have been 
asserted in the initial class action, courts have developed a requirement that the 
release may only reach claims that stem from an identical factual predicate as those 
in the underlying action. Thus, the settling defendant may only buy a release that 
extends up to and not beyond the IFPD.9 
The party seeking preclusion has the burden of raising these affirmative de-
fenses.10 Otherwise, the defenses are waived.11 Res judicata applies to class judg-
ments generally. The release defense only arises where there has been a class set-
tlement. Thus, even though release and res judicata are distinct defenses, in the 
                                                          
 4. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001). 
 5. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 18:6, 18:15. (5th ed. 2018).  In the class 
context, absent class members are not technically parties.  Once a class is certified, absent class members 
are considered parties for preclusion purposes.  See also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894–95 (2008) 
(“Representative suits with preclusive effect on nonparties include properly conducted class actions and 
suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.”) (internal citations omitted); Devlin v. 
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002) (“[N]onnamed class members . . . may be parties for some purposes 
and not for others.  The label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion 
about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”). 
 6. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).   
 7. E.g., Covert v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 779 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding statutory claims 
that could have been raised in earlier litigation barred by res judicata); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. 
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiffs barred from bringing 
their claims because claims arising from same transactional nucleus of fact could have been brought); see 
N. Assurance Co. of Am. v. Square D Co., 201 F.3d 84, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that claim preclusion 
barring claims that could have been brought stems from requirement that plaintiff must bring all claims at 
once against the same defendant relating to the same transaction or event).  
 8. A judgment approving a class settlement satisfies the “final judgment” criteria of res judicata.  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 9. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that a 
court may permit release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as underlying claims in settled 
class action).   
 10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). 
 11. Id. 
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class action settlement context this article will demonstrate that both are circum-
scribed by the IFPD. 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF CLASS SETTLEMENTS 
Class settlements generally include certain features that ensure the finality of 
claims and protect absent class members’ interests. During a class settlement, par-
ties to the settlement agreement typically include a broad release of claims. Re-
leases “are a standard feature of class action settlements.”12 In such a release, the 
parties will agree to release the claims currently at issue in the litigation as well as 
other claims that were not presented to the court. The defendants’ desire to pro-
tect themselves from future claims, coupled with the class plaintiffs’ desire to max-
imize the settlement amount, often produce an expansive release. 
As a general rule, courts allow releases encompassing a broader set of claims 
than those asserted in the class complaint.13 Courts permit the release of a broader 
range of claims to “promot[e] judicial economy by preventing the relitigation of set-
tled questions resolved in comprehensive settlement agreements.”14 Further, de-
fendants might be unwilling to settle with a class unless they can obtain a broad 
release designed to limit future liability. Without some limitation on liability and 
exposure, defendants “would otherwise face nearly limitless liability from related 
lawsuits in jurisdictions throughout the country.”15 As part of such broad releases, 
courts have allowed the release of claims not only pled but also the release of claims 
that were “not presented and might not have [even] been presentable.”16 
Before a class settlement with a release is finalized, the court must enter a 
judgment approving the settlement.17 Court approval is a two-step process.18 First, 
the court must “determin[e] whether the proposed settlement falls within the 
range of possible approval and whether it is reasonable to issue notification to set-
tlement class members of the settlement’s terms.”19 Assuming the Court issues pre-
liminary approval, notice is distributed and absent class members have an oppor-
tunity to object.20 In the second step, after notice and the opportunity for absent 
class members to be heard, the court will determine whether to grant final 
                                                          
 12. Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 616 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 13. See, e.g., id. (“In class action settlements, parties may release not only the very claims raised 
in their cases, but also claims arising out of the ‘identical factual predicate.’”). 
 14. Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., 445 F. App’x 577, 579 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac. Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 15. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 106 (“Broad class action settlements are common, since 
defendants and their cohorts would otherwise face nearly limitless liability from related lawsuits in jurisdic-
tions throughout the country. Practically speaking, ‘[c]lass action settlements simply will not occur if the 
parties cannot set definitive limits on defendants’ liability.’”). 
 16. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 17.  See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, at §18:15.  
 18. Id.  
 19.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). For a judgment to be enforceable, the judgment must have been ren-
dered with due process.  Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The preclusive effect of a prior 
judgment will depend upon whether absent class members were ‘in fact’ adequately represented by parties 
who are present” and will not bind absent class members “if they were not accorded due process of law”). 
 20. Pelt, 539 F.3d at 1284.  
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approval.21 The court may only approve the settlement “after a hearing and on find-
ing that [the settlement] is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”22 
A judgment in a class action lawsuit binds all members of the class and pre-
vents class members from later bringing claims over the same transaction or occur-
rence in a future lawsuit if they have met IFPD.23 Generally, by “precluding parties 
from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” 
the doctrine of preclusion “protect[s] against the expense and vexation attending 
multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and foster[s] reliance on judicial 
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.”24 
IV. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS RAISED BY CLASS SETTLEMENTS 
Class settlements augment some of the concerns that accompany the conclu-
sion of class claims. As a form of representative litigation, the named class members 
litigate, and settle, on behalf of a group of absent class members.25 As a result, ab-
sent class members will be bound by a judgment even though they had no involve-
ment in the litigation or settlement of their claims. Thus, the judicial economy and 
efficiencies generated by a class action settlement directly clash with the right of a 
litigant—in this case, an absent class member with a claim not directly presented in 
the class case—to have due process of law. 
By allowing the release of a broad range of claims—including those of un-
named class members—class settlements raise concerns under the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Specifi-
cally, class settlements pose a risk that the rights of unnamed class members’ claims 
will be sacrificed to the advantage of named class representatives. “Generally 
speaking, absent class members are not ‘parties’ before the court in the sense of 
being able to direct the litigation.”26 Named class representatives and their counsel 
could seek to obtain a better settlement for themselves while “throwing the others’ 
claims ‘to the winds.’”27 
When a class settlement releases claims that were not raised in the settling 
litigation (either intentionally or inadvertently), class members may face preclusion 
arguments if they bring later claims in a different action bearing some relation to 
the underlying settled claims. In that context, defendants, or plaintiffs if facing 
                                                          
 21. See id.; Stanforth v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., No. CIV 09-1146 RB/RHS, 2014 WL 11497806, 
at *3 (D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2014). 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).  For a judgment to be enforceable, the judgment must have been 
rendered with due process.  Pelt, 539 F.3d at 1284 (“The preclusive effect of a prior judgment will depend 
upon whether absent class members were ‘in fact’ adequately represented by parties who are present” and 
will not bind absent class members “if they were not accorded due process of law”). 
 23.  Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, at §18:1. 
 24. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 27. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 462 (“At the heart of our concern was the danger that a class rep-
resentative not sharing common interests with other class members would ‘endeavor[ ] to obtain a better 
settlement by sacrificing the claims of others at no cost to themselves’ by throwing the others’ claims ‘to 
the winds.’”). 
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counter claims, often argue that the affirmative defenses of res judicata and release 
preclude the claims. 
Binding these unnamed parties seemingly undercuts the “deep-rooted his-
toric tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.”28 Balanced against 
this historic tradition is the right to notice and the ability to opt out.29 
A release capturing claims neither “presented” nor “presentable” raises issues 
regarding the efficacy of notice to absent class members.30 It may not be readily 
apparent that non-presentable claims were to be subsumed within the release. In-
effective notice means that claims will be lost by those unwitting victims who fail to 
opt out and thereby protect claims that were neither presented nor presentable. 
V. SAFEGUARDING UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS’ RIGHTS IN CLASS SETTLEMENTS 
Given the due process concerns that arise with class settlements, class mem-
bers when facing preclusion arguments may challenge the enforceability of a class 
action judgment on the grounds that the litigation denied them due process of 
law.31 Procedural due process protection in the class context requires: (i) notice plus 
an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation; (ii) notice that is the 
best practicable and reasonably calculated to apprise parties of the action and op-
portunity to object; (iii) notice that describes the action and rights; (iv) the oppor-
tunity to remove oneself from the class and opt out; and (v) adequate representa-
tion by the named plaintiff(s) of absent class members’ interests.32 
The due process clauses, along with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), 
serve as safeguards protecting the release of unnamed putative class members’ 
claims.33 Under Rule 23(e), class claims may only be settled or dismissed with the 
                                                          
 28. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892. 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Class plaintiffs may seek exclusion from a class certified under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
 30. See Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 115–16 (class settlement release considered sufficient 
where language of release quoted verbatim, which satisfied due process).  
 31. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 880 (“The federal common law of preclusion is, of course, subject to due 
process limitations.”). 
 32. Phillips Petro. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). Class members may challenge a class 
settlement on due process grounds by either (i) objecting to or opting out of a class settlement, Shutts, 472 
U.S. at 812, or (ii) raising due process in response to an affirmative defense asserted in a second, subsequent 
litigation, Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[A]fter the entry 
of final judgment, the unnamed class member can raise a collateral attack based on due process . . . .”). 
Raising a due process challenge after the settlement has been approved often proves to be more difficult 
for class members than opting out or objecting to the settlement on due process grounds before final ap-
proval and judgment.  This is so because some courts have limited the scope of an individual class member’s 
ability to collaterally attack a judgment in a subsequent litigation. Compare Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 
641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Simply put, the absent class members’ due process right to adequate representa-
tion is protected not by collateral review, but by the certifying court initially, and thereafter by appeal within 
the state system and by direct review in the United States Supreme Court.”), with Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Before the bar of claim preclusion may be applied to the claim 
of an absent class member, it must be demonstrated that invocation of the bar is consistent with due pro-
cess, and an absent class member may collaterally attack the prior judgment on the ground that to apply 
claim preclusion would deny him due process.”). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
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court’s approval.34 Rule 23(e) imposes certain requirements in approving a pro-
posed settlement: 
 
• The court must direct notice to all class members who would be 
bound.35 
• The court may approve the settlement binding class members only 
after a hearing and a “finding that it is fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate.”36 
• The parties must file a statement identifying any agreement made in 
connection with the proposed settlement.37 
• If the class action was already certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court 
may refuse to approve the settlement unless it allows class members 
a new opportunity to request exclusion.38 
• Any class member may object to the settlement.39 
 
Rule 23(e)’s requirement that the court approve the settlement and enter a 
finding that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” seeks to reinforce 
due process of law and ensure adequate representation of class members who have 
not participated in shaping the settlement.40 Courts thus have a duty to ensure that 
the settlement is fair and adequate to all potential class members.41 
VI. IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE AS AN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD OF UNNAMED 
CLASS MEMBERS’ RIGHTS 
Although Rule 23(e) serves as a procedural safeguard on the front end during 
the finalization and approval of a class settlement, courts also have established 
safeguards on the back end for unnamed class members when a party argues a class 
settlement release precludes their claims. A class settlement release will only pre-
clude subsequent claims if the released conduct arises out of the “identical factual 
predicate” as the claims at issue in the underlying class litigation.42 Moreover, ade-
quacy of representation in the underlying litigation also must be found.43 
The Second Circuit, which has developed the most case law on the IFPD, re-
quires the existence of (i) an identical factual predicate and (ii) adequacy of 
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns. Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 42. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 18:19. 
 43. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 106; see Reppert v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 
53, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A] court-approved settlement containing a release may be applied against a 
class member who is not a representative member, even if that member objects to the settlement, so long 
as acceptable procedural safeguards have been employed.”) (citing Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 
925 F.2d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1991); see also TBK Partners, 675 F.3d at 462 (“these concerns are not implicated 
where the released claim rests on the same factual predicate as the class action claim”). 
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representation before releasing claims.44 “Together, these legal constructs allow 
plaintiffs to release claims that share the same integral facts as settled claims, pro-
vided that the released claims are adequately represented prior to settlement.”45 
Consequently, even if claims do share an identical factual predicate, the claims will 
not be precluded unless class plaintiffs also adequately represented the interests of 
class members during the underlying litigation.46 Although other circuits have not 
articulated the test in precisely this way, almost all circuits analyze issues of class 
release similarly. 
The IFPD is particularly important given that a class release may release claims 
that were not brought in the class case nor could have been brought.47 To release 
claims that were “not presented and might not have been presentable,” courts re-
quire that the released claims share the identical factual predicate underlying the 
claims in the class litigation.48 Otherwise, there would be no limit on the claims that 
could be released. 
In applying the IFPD, the subsequent court must examine the facts underlying 
both cases to determine if they share sufficient facts to justify the release of 
claims.49 Almost every circuit has adopted the IFPD, and no circuit has rejected it.50 
However, without centralized guidance from the Supreme Court, courts have ap-
plied varying articulations of what the doctrine means and what level of identity or 
similarity of facts is required, particularly in relation to the related defense of res 
judicata. To understand how, and why, courts have struggled with the doctrine’s 
application, it is important to understand the historical context in which the doc-
trine arose. 
VII. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE 
DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DOCTRINE’S APPLICABILITY 
The IFPD seemingly emerged as courts struggled to apply the principles of is-
sue preclusion to class settlements. To explain how a class settlement release would 
preclude subsequent claims, a number of courts analogized release to the affirma-
tive defense of issue preclusion.51 Although a sister doctrine to claim preclusion, 
issue preclusion does not apply in the class settlement context. “Issue preclusion 
generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation 
of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determina-
tion essential to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or 
                                                          
 44. Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 106–07.  
 45. Id. at 106. 
 46. Id. at 109 (“Claims arising from a shared set of facts will not be precluded where class plain-
tiffs have not adequately represented the interests of class members.”).  
 47. Id. at 106–07. 
 48. TBK Partners, 675 F.3d at 460 (“We therefore conclude that in order to achieve a compre-
hensive settlement that would prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action, a court 
may permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in 
the settled class action even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in 
the class action.”); Reppert, 359 F.3d at 58–59 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 
367, 377 (1996)).   
 49. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 107–09. 
 50. See infra note 91 (citing decisions from each Circuit). 
 51. E.g., TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 458. 
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a different claim.”52 Generally, for issue preclusion to apply, the prior case must 
involve: (1) the same issue; (2) actually litigated or determined; (3) by a valid final 
judgment on the merits; (4) in which resolution of the issue was essential to the 
judgment; (5) between the same parties to a later suit.53 As with claim preclusion, 
each circuit uses some version of this test, though most jurisdictions no longer re-
quire complete mutuality.54 
Because most class actions settle without an issue actually being litigated—let 
alone with a finding that that the resolution of the issue was essential to the judg-
ment—few class judgments involve actually litigated issues.55 As a result, parties 
cannot generally rely on issue preclusion to prevent relitigation of claims following 
a class settlement.56 Nevertheless, the IFPD underlying a class settlement release 
has its roots in issue preclusion law. 
In grappling with IFPD and release, several courts have compared the affirm-
ative defense of release to issue preclusion and applied an issue preclusion test to 
determine what claims would be released. The majority of these courts rely on a 
Second Circuit case that serves as one of the foundational, and most cited cases, for 
IFPD. In TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., a group of objectors appealed 
the approval of a class settlement by a federal court. The objectors argued on ap-
peal that the district court erred in approving the settlement because it would en-
join class members from prosecuting claims that were not part of the class action.57 
The objectors were minority shareholders who disapproved of the merger 
price offered by Western Union and the valuation of their shares.58 The objectors 
contended the settlement would bar class members from pursuing appraisal pro-
ceedings in state court to determine the fair value of their shares.59 Thus, the ob-
jectors argued a federal court lacked the power to bar claims that were not, and 
could not, have been asserted in the class action.60 They argued appraisal rights 
were individual statutory rights inappropriate for class adjudication and the New 
York State Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over appraisal proceedings.61 
The Second Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed the decision of the 
district court approving the settlement.62 In doing so, the Second Circuit empha-
sized the district court could “permit the release of a claim based on the identical 
factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action even 
though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in the 
class action.”63 The TBK Partners court went through a detailed analysis of the facts 
                                                          
 52. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 748–49 (emphasis added). 
 53. HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTION § 18.25, at 108 (5th Ed. 2017). 
 54. See Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice & P., Civil 4464. 
 55. NEWBERG, supra note 53, § 18.25, at 113. 
 56. The exception would be if an issue was actually determined before the class settlement and 
judgment. See id. at 112–13. 
 57. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 458. 
 58. See id. at 456.  
 59. See id.  
 60. See id.  
 61. See id.  
 62. See id. 
 63. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460. 
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and found that both the class action and subsequent state appraisal proceeding 
“hinge[d] on the same operative factual predicate”—i.e. the correct valuation of 
whatever reversionary interest was owed to Gold & Stock’s shareholders.64 Because 
the same facts were at issue for both the unpleaded released state claims and the 
pleaded federal claims, the Second Circuit gave preclusive effect to the settlement’s 
release. TBK Partners followed the reasoning of an earlier Second Circuit case—Na-
tional Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange. There, the Second Circuit 
emphasized the basic principle that “[i]f a judgment after trial cannot extinguish 
claims not asserted in the class action complaint, a judgment approving a settle-
ment in such an action ordinarily should not be able to do so either.”65 
The test TBK Partners applied in analyzing the release was akin to issue pre-
clusion, not claim preclusion.66 But in approving the release of claims, TBK Partners 
warned that “[c]ourts should be cautious about permitting issue preclusion in the 
context of a settlement of a class action.”67 The Second Circuit further stated: 
[A]pproval of a settlement does not call for findings of fact regarding the 
claims to be compromised. The court is concerned only with the likelihood 
of success or failure, the actual merits of the controversy are not to be 
determined. The evidence is limited accordingly. The rules of evidence are 
relaxed. The court listens to the advice and wishes of interested parties. 
This is not the procedural stuff from which binding determinations of fact 
can be drawn.68 
The TBK Partners court’s concern regarding the sacrifice of some claims to ob-
tain a better settlement were “not implicated where the released claim rests on the 
same factual predicate as the class action claim.”69 TBK Partners thus “announced 
a principled test for limiting the preclusive effect of a judgment based upon a class 
settlement.”70 Although TBK Partners captioned the analysis it applied as issue pre-
clusion, the Second Circuit did not preclude the claims based on issue preclusion 
                                                          
 64. Id. (“It would be hard to imagine a claim that would be more tightly connected to those as-
serted in the class action than a claim in an appraisal proceeding that Western Union had undervalued the 
reversionary interest due Gold & Stock . . . .”). 
 65. Id. at 461 (quoting Nat’l Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 18 (1981); see 
also Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Epstein I”) (“Had the judgment been based upon 
an adjudication rather than a settlement of the federal claims, the unpleaded state law claims would have 
been barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion because they turned on the ‘very same set of facts.’”).  Na-
tional Super Spuds did not affirm the district court’s approval of a settlement that would release distinct 
claims that depended not only on a different legal theory but also on proof of further facts—the holding of 
unliquidated contracts.  TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460 (citing Nat’l Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 18). 
 66. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 663 (“TBK Partners announced and applied an issue preclusion test, not 
an ‘arising out of the same transaction’ test, in defining the limits on a court’s power to release claims in a 
class settlement.”). 
 67. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 461. 
 68. Id. (citing William E. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders’ Actions-Part II: 
The Settlement, 23 SW. L.J. 765, 809 (1969)). 
 69. Id. at 462 (concluding district court “exercised the extra vigilance required to ensure that a 
settlement’s release of a claim not asserted in the class action does not unfairly disadvantage individual 
class members.”). 
 70. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 663 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).  
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because a class settlement release does not involve adjudicated issues.71 Neverthe-
less, the Second Circuit’s version of issue preclusion in the class settlement context 
served as the foundation for what became the identical factual predicate doctrine. 
In Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (“Epstein I”), the Ninth Circuit in analyzing the Second 
Circuit’s decision in TBK Partners explained that “had the judgment been based 
upon an adjudication rather than a settlement of the federal claims, the unpleaded 
state law claims would have been barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion be-
cause they turned on the ‘very same set of facts.’”72 In Epstein I, which was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court in Matsushita, the defendant-appellee argued a Del-
aware Court of Chancery judgment approving a state class settlement precluded 
the federal claims in the pending action.73 The Ninth Circuit disagreed in Epstein I, 
holding the settlement of the Delaware class action did not preclude the class action 
at issue.74 
Epstein I declined to directly address the identical factual predicate doctrine.75 
Instead, Epstein I distinguished TBK Partners because it was not a supremacy clause 
case and because it applied an issue preclusion test, not an “arising out of the same 
transaction” test with regards to the court’s power to release claims in a class set-
tlement.76 Although the Epstein I court determined Nat’l Super Spuds and TBK Part-
ners “together provide[d] the doctrinal framework for using issue preclusion in de-
termining the limits of judicial authority to release unpleaded claims in settling class 
actions,” the court emphasized neither case touched on the issue before it—the 
preemptive effect of an exclusive federal jurisdiction statute on the reach of state 
judicial power in settling class actions.77 
                                                          
   71. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 461.  
 72. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 663 (citing TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460). 
   73. Id. at 649. 
   74. Id. 
   75.  Id. at 663. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 663–64 (distinguishing cases that involved release of unpleaded state claims by federal 
district courts which had or may have had pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate claims).  The Epstein I Court 
determined the federal claims extinguished by the Delaware judgment could not have been extinguished 
by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the state claims because they were based upon different 
underlying facts. Id. at 665. The Court also determined that because the district court released exclusively 
federal claims, a Delaware state judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 666. Because the 
Delaware court could not have extinguished the claims through adjudication because it did not have juris-
diction, the judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion but did so on different grounds. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 386 
(1996) (“The Court of Appeals did not engage in any analysis of Delaware law pursuant to § 1738.  Rather, 
the Court of Appeals declined to apply § 1738 on the ground that where the rendering forum lacked juris-
diction over the subject matter or the parties, full faith and credit is not required.”).  The Supreme Court 
determined the Delaware judgment was entitled to full faith and credit even though it released claims 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. Id. at 368–87. On remand, the Ninth Circuit again held 
that the Delaware state judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because it violated due process 
based on the inadequacy of the class representation, but then withdrew its opinion on petition for rehear-
ing.  Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 642 (9th Cir. 1999). The court determined that the Supreme Court’s 
holding was premised on the validity of the Delaware judgment.  Id. at 644–45 (“While the Court’s explicit 
consideration in Matsushita of the due process requirements to bind absent class members admittedly did 
not include an express statement that the Delaware judgment in question did not violate due process, that 
conclusion was logically necessary to the Court’s holding.”). 
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The Epstein I court analyzed two other cases—Grimes v. Vitalink Communica-
tions Corp.78and Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp.,79 which did implicate the 
supremacy clause because exclusively federal securities claims were released by a 
state court judgment approving a class settlement.80 Epstein I noted the judgments 
were given preclusive effect because the state and federal claims arose out of the 
identical factual predicate.81 “In other words, had the judgment followed an adju-
dication rather than a settlement, it would necessarily have resolved the federal 
claims as a matter of issue preclusion.”82 
Epstein I, however, declined to go that far in its holding.83 Instead, the Ninth 
Circuit found that “[a]ll we need decide today is whether to break new ground in 
giving preclusive effect that a state court judgment that extinguished exclusively 
federal claims that are factually unrelated to the state claims pleaded in the class 
action.”84 To the Ninth Circuit in Epstein I, because the state court did not have ju-
risdiction—and thus could not have adjudicated the claims—the state court judg-
ment could not have been given preclusive effect.85 Although the court did not ul-
timately address identical factual predicate, it approvingly cited the underlying pol-
icy of the doctrine, which it found “counsel[s] against an expansive state court 
power to release exclusively federal claims.”86 Specifically: 
In applying an issue preclusion test rather than a ‘same transaction’ test, 
the cases embrace Judge Friendly’s common sense reasoning that a court’s 
jurisdiction to extinguish claims by class settlement should not exceed its 
jurisdiction to extinguish claims by adjudication. Ignoring this reasoning, 
Matsushita asks us to impose a ‘same transaction’ test without offering 
logic or precedent in support of such a test. As we shall now show, the 
federal claims extinguished by the Delaware judgment could not have 
been extinguished by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the 
state claims because, although the federal and state claims arose out of 
the same transaction, they are based upon different underlying facts.87 
After proceeding to analyze the facts underlying the claims—and finding that 
the only thing they shared in common was that they arose out of the same transac-
tion—the Court ultimately limited its opinion to jurisdiction and full faith and credit, 
concluding the state court could not extinguish exclusively federal claims that could 
                                                          
 78. Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns. Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 79. Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 80. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 664. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (noting this was a question of first impression of whether Congress, in denying state courts 
subject matter jurisdiction over Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Act claims, intended to leave state courts 
with the power to extinguish exclusively federal claims by approving a class settlement that could not have 
been extinguished by adjudicating the class action). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 664. 
 87. Id. at 664–65. 
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not have been extinguished through adjudication.88 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the Court rejected Epstein I’s articulation of the adjudication test.89 Instead, 
the Supreme Court held that the Delaware judgment did not bar further prosecu-
tion of federal claims under the full faith and credit clause. 90  The Court, however, 
did not base its holding on the identical factual predicate doctrine or approve its 
application, leaving much to the interpretation of the circuit courts. 
VIII. THE BREADTH OF THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE DOCTRINE IN CURRENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The lack of Supreme Court guidance on the IFPD has left its interpretation and 
application to the respective circuits. Almost every circuit has applied the IFPD in 
the context of a release in a class action settlement, with the exception being the 
Fifth Circuit.91 Although the Tenth Circuit has not applied the IFPD in analyzing the 
preclusive effect of a class settlement release, it has acknowledged the existence of 
the doctrine and district courts in the Tenth Circuit have applied it, citing to other 
circuits.92 
                                                          
 88. Id. at 666 (“[W]e hold that the decree exceeds the jurisdiction of the state court and, there-
fore, is not entitled to full faith and credit.”). 
 89. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 378. 
 90. Id. at 386–87. 
 91. See, e.g., Reppert v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing 
doctrine but determining that release was “sufficiently broad to encompass the appellants’ complaint and 
the allegations therein”); City P’ship Co. v. Atl. Acquisition Ltd., 100 F.3d 1041 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing doctrine 
and finding claims stemmed from problems with tender offers and arose from same factual predicate); 
Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding claims shared a single factual predi-
cate); In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any 
released claims not presented directly in the complaint, however, must be ‘based on the identical factual 
predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action.’”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., 
Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiffs in a class action may release claims that were or could have 
been pled in exchange for settlement relief.  Plaintiffs’ authority to release claims is limited by the ‘identical 
factual predicate’ and ‘adequacy of representation’ doctrines.  Together, these legal constructs allow plain-
tiffs to release claims that share the same integral facts as settled claims, provided that the released claims 
are adequately represented prior to settlement.”); Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., 445 F. App’x 577, 
579 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The key inquiry is whether the factual predicate for future claims is identical to the 
factual predicate underlying the settlement agreement.”); Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 616 (4th Cir. 
2015) (finding claims based on same product that enables debt collectors to locate assets were released); 
Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The question is not whether the definition 
of the claim in the complaint and the definition of the claim in the release overlap perfectly; it is whether 
the released claims share a ‘factual predicate’ with ‘the claims pled in the complaint.’”); Williams v. Gen. 
Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding claims were based on identical factual 
predicate involving leases and potential for an early termination penalty); Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 
1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing identical factual predicate doctrine and finding claims do not arise from 
same “‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence’”); cf. Thompson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 992 F.2d 187, 191 
n.6 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that suitability claims rested on same or similar facts as class action claims, but 
not citing identical factual predicate doctrine specifically); Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 591 (9th Cir. 
2010) (finding claims did not share an identical factual predicate with claims resolved in class settlement, 
but overlapping discussion with doctrine of res judicata); Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 333 F. 
App’x 414 (11th Cir. 2009) (conflating release and res judicata and citing identical factual predicate doctrine). 
 92. See In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 872 F.3d 1094, 1115 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(declining to consider argument on release of claims based on identical factual predicate when not raised 
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The existing circuit case law highlights the ambiguity of whether the doctrine 
would apply under both release and res judicata. At a glance, an “identical factual 
predicate” appears to be a stricter standard than the factual element of res judi-
cata—i.e. same transaction or occurrence. The same transaction or occurrence fac-
tor under res judicata typically requires meeting several criteria, including showing 
a common nucleus of operative fact. 93 A class settlement release, on the other 
hand, requires identity of fact.94 And, at least in the Ninth Circuit, an identical fac-
tual predicate means both the same set of facts (the predicate) and the same in-
jury.95 
Some courts have interpreted identical factual predicate to be narrower than 
the more relaxed standard of same transaction or occurrence under res judicata.96 
The Ninth Circuit in Epstein I certainly viewed the factual identity required as sepa-
rate and distinct from the “same transaction or occurrence.”97 
But other courts have not viewed the factual similarity required as different, 
often using the “identical factual predicate” and “common nucleus of operative 
                                                          
in district court).  A number of Tenth Circuit district courts have applied the identical factual predicate doc-
trine, citing Second Circuit cases.  E.g., Stanforth v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., No. CIV 09-1146 RB/RHS, 2014 
WL 11497806, at *4 (D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2014) (“emphasizing that “[i]t is well-established that ‘a court may 
permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the 
settled class action” and finding that cases are based on same factual predicate); Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
No. CIV-13-876-D, 2014 WL 819385 (W.D. Okla. March 3, 2014) (finding stay appropriate where if class set-
tlement approved, it would likely prevent class members from subsequently asserting claims relying on a 
different legal theory than that relied on in the class action, but depending upon same factual predicate); 
Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Tr. v. XTO Energy, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1308 (D. Kan. 2010) (“class 
action releases may include claims not presented and even those which could not have been presented as 
long as the released conduct arises out of the ‘identical factual predicate’ as the settled conduct.”) (quoting 
Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 107).   
 93. E.g., Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Whether two cases implicate 
the same cause of action turns on whether they share the same nucleus of facts.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F.3d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (laying out criteria for whether two 
claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, including whether they arise out of the same transactional 
nucleus of facts). 
 94. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 95. Id. at 749 (holding claims released because price-fixing conduct and “the underlying injury 
are identical”); In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 752 F. App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(question of whether Plaintiff was injured forms part of factual predicate); Hesse, 598 F.3d at 589 (holding 
release was not enforceable to bar claims “brought to remedy a different set of injuries. . .”); see also McKin-
ney-Drobnis v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, No. 16-cv-06450-MMC, 2017 WL 1246933, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 5, 2017) (finding claims not barred by prior settlement where based on different breaches and different 
injuries); Anderson v. Nextel Retail Stores, LLC, 2010 WL 8591002, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (“The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that ‘[w]hile Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable by positing a different theory of anti-
competitive conduct, the price-fixing predicate (price-fixing interchange rates) and the underlying injury are 
identical.’”) (quoting Reyn’s Pasta, 442 F.3d at 749); Cancilla v. Ecolab Inc., No. C 12-03001 CRB, 2014 WL 
2943237, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) (“As already discussed, the Cancilla claims depend upon the same 
set of facts as Ladore . . . and both actions’ underlying injuries of unpaid overtime are identical—thus, this 
case shares an identical factual predicate as Ladore.”). 
 96. At least two courts have found the doctrine hinges on proof.  For example, one court in the 
Second Circuit found if claims depend upon proof of further facts, there would be a separate factual predi-
cate and identical factual predicate could not be met. Burgess v. Citigroup Inc., 624 F. App’x 6, 9 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“distinct claims that depend ‘upon proof of further facts’ constitute a ‘separate factual predicate.’”); 
see In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 725 F. App’x 560 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 97. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough the federal and state claims 
arose out of the same transaction, they are based upon different underlying facts.”). 
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fact” terms interchangeably.98 For example, the Ninth Circuit in Class Plaintiffs v. 
City of Seattle—a case three years before Epstein I—reasoned that “[t]he weight of 
authority holds that a federal court may release not only those claims alleged in the 
complaint, but also a claim ‘based on the identical factual predicate as that under-
lying the claims in the settled class action . . . .’”99 Yet, in Class Plaintiffs’ analysis, 
the court found the claims asserted in the two actions “arise from the same com-
mon nucleus of operative fact” and could therefore be released.100 
The Ninth Circuit in Hesse v. Sprint Corp. set forth a similarly convoluted anal-
ysis of release that also overlapped with res judicata.101 In Hesse, the district court 
granted Sprint’s motion for summary judgment after finding that the suit was 
barred by a class settlement between Sprint and its customers approved by a Kan-
sas state court (the “Benney Settlement”).102 The Benney Settlement resulted from 
allegations that Sprint’s surcharges to recoup federal regulatory fees violated con-
sumer protection laws, were a breach of contract, and resulted in unjust enrich-
ment.103 The district court accepted Sprint’s argument that the plaintiffs’ claims fell 
within the broad release of liability in the Benney Settlement.104 
The Ninth Circuit reversed.105 First, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “[a] set-
tlement agreement may preclude a party from bringing a related claim in the future 
‘even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in 
the class action,’ but only where the released claim is ‘based on the identical factual 
predicate as that underling the claims in the settled class action.’”106 The Ninth Cir-
cuit cited several cases as examples of precedent holding that courts may properly 
release claims not alleged in the underlying complaint where those claims de-
pended on the same set of facts as the claims that gave rise to the settlement.107 
The Hesse court then shifted its focus and discussed whether Kansas law “is guided 
by the same general principles” of claim preclusion as the Ninth Circuit.108 In ana-
lyzing whether claim preclusion would apply, the court noted the claims did “not 
share an identical factual predicate with the claims resolved in the Benney settle-
ment.”109 Yet, in concluding that the claims lacked an identical factual predicate, 
the court emphasized that the Washington claims were “not derived from the same 
‘transaction or occurrence’ as the claims” in Benney, seemingly reverting to a res 
judicata factual standard.110 The court, however, ultimately rooted its opinion in the 
doctrine of release and adequacy of representation.111 
                                                          
 98. See Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 99. Id. at 1287–88 (quoting TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460). 
100. Id. at 1288. 
 101. See generally Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2010). 
102. Id. at 585. 
103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 597. 
105. Id. at 592.  
 106. Id. at 590 (quoting Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 107. Hesse, 598 F.3d at 590. 
 108. Id. at 581. 
109. Id. at 591. 
 110. Id. at 592. 
 111. Id. at 584. 
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The Eleventh Circuit in Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n used the 
identical factual predicate and common nucleus of operative fact tests interchange-
ably.112 The Eleventh Circuit, however, adopted a different approach than Class 
Plaintiffs, but similar to that of Hesse. The Thomas court applied the IFPD when 
analyzing res judicata (claim preclusion), not release.113 After finding the first three 
elements of res judicata were not disputed—i.e. final judgment on the merits, ren-
dered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and identity of parties—the court ana-
lyzed whether the causes of action were the same.114 The physician counterclaim-
ant argued Blue Cross must show an identical factual predicate for claim preclusion 
to apply.115 The court found that “an ‘identical factual predicate’ requires only a 
common nucleus of operative fact.”116 The Court concluded that the actions 
“share[d] the same operative nucleus of fact” and that “the district court did not 
err in finding that [the defendant’s] counterclaims were released by the settlement 
agreement after he failed to opt out.”117 
Despite the conflation of the two tests by some courts, identical factual pred-
icate is not the same as “same transaction or occurrence” or “common nucleus of 
operative fact.” As the court in Epstein I observed, claims can arise “out of the same 
transaction, [but be] based upon different underlying facts.”118 For example, alt-
hough the Ninth Circuit in Reorganized FLI, Inc. v. OneOK, Inc. found a prior class 
action and a subsequent litigation both challenged manipulative trading practices 
that allegedly inflated the price of natural gas, the court found the class settlement 
release from the prior action was not enforceable against the plaintiff in the subse-
quent litigation under the identical factual predicate rule.119 The Ninth Circuit em-
phasized that “even if those elements of the factual predicates of each claim are 
identical, the question whether [the plaintiff] was injured by Defendants—as well 
as the follow-on questions of when, and where, and how—are also part of the fac-
tual predicate of [the plaintiff’s] claims made here.”120 Because the two cases “de-
pend[ed] on proof of different facts to establish a different injury,” the defendants 
in the subsequent litigation were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
their affirmative defense of release.121 
To be sure, the identical factual predicate doctrine applies in the context of 
res judicata where there has been a class action settlement. But IFPD does not fall 
under the same transaction or occurrence prong. Instead, an identical factual pred-
icate is part of the valid, final judgment prong of res judicata. 
When faced with a class settlement, the court must approve the settlement 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).122 In approving a settlement, the court must accept the 
                                                          
 112. Thomas v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 333 F. App’x 414, 417–18 (11th Cir 2009). 
113. Id. at 417. 
 114. Id.  
115. Id.  
 116. Thomas, 333 F. App’x at 417 (citing Adams v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 493 F.3d 1276, 
1289 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
 117. Thomas, 333 F. App’x at 419–20. 
 118. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 119.  In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 725 F. App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 120. Id. at 563 (citing Hesse, 598 F.3d at 581 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 121. Id. at 563.  
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 
2019 CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: RES JUDICATA, RELEASE, AND 
THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE DOCTRINE 
279 
 
release.123 Once the release and settlement have been approved, and only then, 
the Court may enter its final judgment.124 As a result, to reach a final judgment, a 
Court must approve the release, which is limited to foreclosing only those claims 
that share an identical factual predicate.125 Even a reviewing court must apply the 
IFPD to limit the sweep of a broad release.126 Thus, the identical factual predicate 
doctrine is embedded within the analytical framework that underlies the final judg-
ment element of res judicata. 
The Ninth Circuit in Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc. applied a similar 
analysis as proposed, though under the rubric of issue preclusion, not claim preclu-
sion.127 In analyzing whether an action was barred by a class settlement, the court 
explained that:  
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in an earlier pro-
ceeding if three requirements are met: (1) the issue necessarily decided at 
the previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relit-
igated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; 
and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party 
or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.128  
The Reyn’s Pasta court found the underlying class court’s decision that the 
settlement released the plaintiff’s claims was necessary to the court’s final judg-
ment approving the settlement.129 To approve the settlement under Rule 23(e)(2), 
“the Wal-Mart courts necessarily had to adjudicate the objections Plaintiffs raised, 
including whether the Wal-Mart settlement released Plaintiffs’ price-fixing 
claims.”130 
The Reyn’s Pasta court alternatively found that, even if issue preclusion were 
not applicable, the claims were released by virtue of the identical factual predicate 
doctrine.131 Although the cases involved different legal theories of antitrust liability, 
the court concluded the price-fixing predicate based on interchange rates and the 
                                                          
123. Id.  
124. Id.  
125. Id.  
 126. See TBK Partners LTD. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1982); Reppert v. Marvin 
Lumber and Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004). 
127. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 128. Id. at 746 (citing Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 129. Reyn’s Pasta differs from many class settlements in that many of the issues raised in the 
subsequent litigation were actually litigated in the underlying class action.  During the underlying class fair-
ness hearing approving the settlement, the parties litigated “virtually all of the issues they raise[d]” in the 
subsequent litigation.  Reyn’s Pasta, 442 F.3d at 746 n.6.  The court took judicial notice of the briefs in the 
prior action and the transcript from the fairness hearing that showed the litigated issues.  Id.  Because the 
issues were actually litigated in the prior class case, the determination of the issues was found to be neces-
sary to the final judgment, thus satisfying two important prongs of issue preclusion.  See id. 
 130. Reyn’s Pasta, 442 F.3d at 746 (noting that plaintiffs in underlying suit litigated “virtually all of 
the issues they raise here” in the fairness hearing). 
 131.   Id. at 748 (quoting Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1287–89 (9th Cir. 1992)) (“The 
weight of authority holds that a federal court may release not only those claims alleged in the complaint, 
but also a claim ‘based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class 
action . . .’”). 
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underlying injury were identical.132 “Thus, the [earlier class settlement] release en-
compasses Plaintiffs’ claims if they arise from an identical factual predicate as the 
claims asserted by the [earlier] class.”133 
IX. BOTH RELEASE AND RES JUDICATA ARE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY IFPD 
This reasoning of Reyn’s Pasta—albeit in the issue preclusion context—should 
influence the reasoning all courts employ when considering arguments that later 
claims are precluded by res judicata and release. If a party asserts res judicata based 
on a prior class settlement as a defense, the party must meet its burden of meeting 
the elements of res judicata, including that the previous court entered a final judg-
ment. For the prior court entering a final judgment to approve the class settlement, 
it necessarily could only approve a settlement release that extended as far as claims 
sharing an identical factual predicate. Thus, the final judgment prong of res judicata 
is circumscribed by IFPD. 
As a result, a court faced with the defenses of res judicata and release should 
start its analysis based on the identical factual predicate doctrine. If an identity of 
facts is not shown, a party asserting res judicata and release should not prevail on 
either doctrine. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The release of unnamed class members’ claims in a class settlement raises due 
process concerns that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and development of fed-
eral common law, seek to minimize. Thus, although broad releases of claims in the 
class settlement context are generally permitted, a release will not automatically 
preclude subsequent claims touching on the same facts as the underlying litigation 
unless the parties can demonstrate an identical factual predicate.134 The identical 
factual predicate doctrine, however, has been subject to various interpretations 
and applications by the circuits. Under these varying interpretations, courts have 
not been clear whether the doctrine also applies in the context of res judicata or 
whether identical factual predicate has the same meaning as the same transaction 
or occurrence element. 
Finding an identical factual predicate is necessary to determining whether res 
judicata or release preclude claims. Courts have emphasized that a release may only 
release claims that share an identical factual predicate, and not beyond. Thus, a 
court cannot approve a class settlement release and consequently the settlement 
unless it determines the release will not extend beyond the boundaries of IFPD. In 
entering a final judgment approving a class settlement, the court makes the neces-
sary determination that the release does not capture claims that do not share an 
identical factual predicate. This final judgment then later serves as one of the 
prongs in asserting a res judicata defense. Consequently, the identical factual pred-
icate is a necessary prerequisite for both res judicata and class settlement release 
defenses. 
                                                          
 132. Id. at 749. 
 133. Id. at 748. 
 134. Adequacy of representation must also be found.  
